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Abstract
Quantum key distribution allows two parties, traditionally known
as Alice and Bob, to establish a secure random cryptographic key if,
firstly, they have access to a quantum communication channel, and
secondly, they can exchange classical public messages which can be
monitored but not altered by an eavesdropper, Eve. Quantum key dis-
tribution provides perfect security because, unlike its classical coun-
terpart, it relies on the laws of physics rather than on ensuring that
successful eavesdropping would require excessive computational effort.
However, security proofs of quantum key distribution are not trivial
and are usually restricted in their applicability to specific protocols.
In contrast, we present a general and conceptually simple proof which
can be applied to a number of different protocols. It relies on the fact
that a cryptographic procedure called privacy amplification is equally
secure when an adversary’s memory for data storage is quantum rather
than classical [1].
1 Introduction
The potential power of quantum phenomena to protect information was first
adumbrated by Wiesner who, in the early 1970’s, introduced the concept of
quantum conjugate coding [2]. He showed how to store or transmit two
messages by encoding them in two conjugate observables, such as linear and
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circular polarization of light, so that either but not both of may be received
and decoded. He illustrated his idea with a design of unforgeable bank
notes. Building upon this work, Bennett and Brassard proposed a quantum
key distribution scheme, known as BB84 or the four state protocol, in which
Alice repeatedly sends to Bob one of four prescribed states of a qubit, and
Bob measures them in one of two conjugate bases [3]. Independently and
initially unaware of the earlier work, Ekert developed a different approach
to quantum cryptography based on quantum entanglement. He proposed a
key distribution protocol, known as E91, in which entangled pairs of qubits
are distributed to Alice and Bob, who then extract key bits by measuring
their qubits in prescribed bases [4]. A particularly nice feature of E91, for
the purpose of security analysis, is that Eve herself is allowed to prepare
and deliver all the qubit pairs that Alice and Bob will subsequently use to
generate the key.
Many variations on quantum key distribution have been subsequently
proposed and we will mention some of them later on. They can be roughly
divided into “prepare and measure” protocols, such as BB84 and B92 [5], and
“entanglement based” protocols, such as E91. Many interesting techniques
for manipulating quantum entanglement have been discovered in the last
few years. Thus it is often convenient to cast some of the “prepare and
measure” protocols in terms of the “entanglement based” ones.
1.1 Security Proofs
All good quantum key distribution protocols must be operable in the pres-
ence of noise that may or may not result from eavesdropping. The proto-
cols must specify for which values of measurable parameters Alice and Bob
can establish a secret key and provide a physically implementable proce-
dure which generates such a key. The design of the procedure must take
into account that an eavesdropper may have access to unlimited quantum
computing power. On Alice and Bob’s side, the procedure should rely on
simple and easily implementable operations. For example, good protocols
should not assume that Alice and Bob have quantum computers, or any
sophisticated quantum technology, apart from the ability to transmit over a
quantum channel.
The search for operational security criteria led to early studies of quan-
tum eavesdropping [6, 7] and finally to the first proof of the security of key
distribution [8]. The original proof showed that the E91 and all entangle-
ment based key distributions are indeed secure and noise-tolerant against
an adversary with unlimited computing power as long as Alice and Bob can
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implement quantum privacy amplification. Quantum privacy amplification
allows one to establish a secure key over any distance, e.g. using entan-
glement swapping [9] in a chain of quantum repeaters [10, 11]. However,
this procedure, which distills pure entangled states from corrupted mixed
states of two qubits, requires a small scale quantum computation. Subse-
quent proofs by Inamori [12] and Ben-Or [13] showed that Alice and Bob can
also distill a secret key from partially entangled particles using only classical
error correction and classical privacy amplification [14, 15].
Quantum privacy amplification was also used by Lo and Chau to prove
the security of the BB84 protocol over an arbitrary distance [16]. A con-
current and independent proof by Mayers showed that the protocol can
be secure without Alice and Bob having to rely on the use of quantum
computers [17]. The same conclusion, but using different techniques, was
subsequently reached by Biham et al. [18]. Although the two proofs did not
require quantum privacy amplification they were rather complex. A nice
fusion of quantum privacy amplification and error correction was proposed
by Shor and Preskill who formulated a relatively simple proof of the security
of the BB84 protocol based on virtual quantum error correction [19]. They
showed that a protocol which employs quantum error-correcting codes to
prevent Eve from becoming entangled with qubits that are used to generate
the key reduces to the BB84 augmented by classical error correction and
classical privacy amplification. This proof has been further extended by
Gottesman and Lo [20] to cover the case of two-way public communication
in BB84 which allows a higher bit error rate, and by Tamaki et al.[21] to
prove the security of the B92 protocol. More recently another simple proof of
the security of BB84, which employs results from quantum communication
complexity, has been provided by Ben-Or [13].
1.2 Do we need another Security Proof?
Most popular quantum key distribution schemes have been analyzed in terms
of their security criteria and there is a pretty good understanding of the
limitations of the techniques involved e.g. those due to imperfect sources
or detectors. The schemes vary but every single one of them must involve
either quantum or classical privacy amplification as an inherent part of the
secure key distillation protocol.
Classical privacy amplification, originally proposed by Bennett, Bras-
sard and Robert, was restricted to the case in which Eve acquires classical,
deterministic information about the raw key [14]. The applicability of the
method was then extended by Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau and Maurer to
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cover scenarios where Eve’s information is classical and probabilistic [15].
We use the recent result by Ko¨nig, Maurer and Renner on the power of
quantum memory [1] in a quantum cryptographic context. It can be viewed
as a further generalization of classical privacy amplification to cases in which
Eve’s information about the key is quantum. Of course, the privacy ampli-
fication is useless unless we can derive an upper bound on the amount of
quantum information available to Eve. We show how to do this for com-
mon quantum key distribution protocols. Taken together these results give
a very general and powerful technique for assessing security of a wide class
of quantum key distribution protocols.
1.3 Scenario
In our scenario Eve has a technological advantage over Alice and Bob. She
can distribute qubits to Alice and Bob, she can entangle the qubits with an
ancilla that she controls, she can have access to unlimited quantum compu-
tational power, and she can monitor all the public communication between
Alice and Bob in which they reveal their measurement choices and exchange
further information in order to correct errors in their shared key and to am-
plify its privacy. In contrast Alice and Bob can only perform measurements
on individual qubits and communicate classically over a public channel. We
will assess the security in the case of a noisy quantum channel without losses.
Alice and Bob go through prescribed stages of quantum key distribution
and at some point they end up with perfectly correlated binary strings about
which Eve has some information, namely all information communicated in
public together with all information contained in her ancilla. The ancilla
is a quantum entity which Eve may measure at the very end of the key
distribution protocol. Hence its information content has to be expressed
in qubits rather than bits. Classical privacy amplification allows Alice and
Bob to increase the privacy of the shared string as long as they can estimate
the amount of classical information that leaked to Eve [14]. For any shared
string of n bits upon which Eve has some r bits of information the procedure
outputs a binary string of length s shorter than n− r and such that Eve has
virtually no information about the new string. The snag is that Eve, who
can delay her measurement of the ancilla, has r qubits rather than r bits of
information about the n–bit string. However, in this particular context, it
does not matter, as shown in [1]. We show how Alice and Bob are able to
estimate the quantum information content of r qubits in Eve’s ancilla in a
generic quantum key distribution protocol.
4
2 Outline of the Main Result
It is convenient for the purpose of this outline to start with a generic scenario
in which Eve distributes quantum particles to Alice and Bob. Without any
loss of generality we assume that Eve starts with a tripartite pure state de-
scribing a batch of particles delivered to Alice, a batch of particles delivered
to Bob, and an ancilla which is retained by Eve.
When Alice and Bob receive their respective particles they perform mea-
surements following a quantum key distribution protocol, which they agreed
to in advance. For example, they may measure every single particle choos-
ing randomly from a prescribed set of different measurements. They also
communicate in public and agree which outcomes of the measurements are
to be discarded and which will be used for the key generation.
At this point Alice and Bob have partially correlated n bit strings la-
beled, respectively, as X and Y . Eve knows the protocol and holds an
ancilla which was entangled with the qubits prior to Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surements. After the measurements the ancilla is in a quantum state which,
in general, depends on X and Y and is described by some density operator
ρE . The initial public communication must allow Alice and Bob to esti-
mate the degree of the correlation between X and Y and to derive an upper
bound on the quantum information content of the ancilla in state ρE. This
is not trivial as we do not assume that the pairs of qubits are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d); they can be entangled between themselves
and the ancilla in an arbitrary way.
We solve the problem in its full generality. However, in this section we
present a rough outline based on the i.i.d case. This, we hope, will serve as
a gentle introduction to the more technical sections that follow.
Let Alice and Bob be given n realizations of i.i.d random variables X
and Y respectively. Let the degree of correlations be quantified by the
mutual information I(X;Y ) and let the quantum information content of
the ancilla be no more than r qubits. The strings of Alice and Bob can
be made identical with high probability by a procedure called information
reconciliation. Alice has to communicate in public approximately nH(X|Y )
(the conditional entropy of X given Y ) bits about her string so that Bob,
who holds n realizations of Y , can guess Alice’s string correctly.
Thus, after the information reconciliation, Eve’s information about Al-
ice’s string consists of nH(X|Y ) classical bits and r qubits. Without any
loss of generality we can assume that Eve’s information is contained in
nH(X|Y ) + r qubits. Eve can wait and perform her measurement on the
ancilla whenever she sees fit. However, no matter which observable she mea-
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sures after the classical privacy amplification she is not better off than she
would be if she had nH(X|Y )+r classical bits of information about X prior
to the privacy amplification. This follows from the recent work by Ko¨nig,
Maurer, and Renner on the power of quantum memory [1]. We will elaborate
on this in more detail in section 3 and section 4. Thus the length of the secret
key after the privacy amplification is nH(X)−nH(X|Y )−r = nI(X;Y )−r,
i.e. the key can be established when nI(X;Y ) > r.
In the main part of the paper we will show how the estimation of r works
in general. In order to illustrate the idea behind this estimation, let us
consider the particular case of independent and identically distributed pairs
of quantum states. Each pair that Eve delivers to Alice and Bob comes
from a tripartite pure state |Ψ〉 such that ρ = trE |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is the density
operator of each pair of quantum states and ρE = trAB |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is the density
operator of a part of the ancilla. The state of the ancilla in an n-fold tensor
product of the form ρE = ρe ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρe. In this particular case we can use
the quantum coding results [22, 23] to estimate r in the limit of large n;
r = nS(ρe) = nS(ρ) qubits, where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ;
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ).
In the qubit case, the mutual information can be written as I(X;Y ) =
n(1 − h(ǫ)), where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log ǫ− (1 − ǫ) log(1 − ǫ) is the binary entropy
function and ǫ is the average bit error rate. The threshold error rate can be
then established from the condition
1− h(ǫ) ≥ S(ρ). (1)
A key distribution protocol should allow Alice and Bob to estimate the
purity of the pairs of quantum states in terms of the von Neumann entropy
S(ρ). If not they need to maximize S(ρ) over all possible density operators
ρ which are consistent with the estimated bit error rate ǫ.
Moreover the key rate R is
R = H(X)−H(X|Y )−max
ρˆ∈R
S(ρˆ) , (2)
(see section 4.4.3)
The argument above relies on the extension of the applicability of classi-
cal privacy amplification to the cases where Eve has partial quantum rather
than partial classical information about the key. This follows from a more
general observation that encoding classical information into qubits rather
than bits, although never worse, does not offer any significant advantage in
some scenarios; ours being one of them. Amazingly enough potential ad-
vantages of quantum encoding were already pointed out by Wiesner in his
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seminal paper on conjugate coding [2]. Subsequently Ambainis, Nayak, Ta-
Shma and Vazirani [24] considered a scenario where one has to use partial
information about a binary string X to answer a random binary question
about X. One might think that storing partial information about X in a
quantum rather than classical memory has a natural advantage because one
can delay a measurement on the quantum memory until after the question
has been asked. This gives an extra freedom of choosing the most appro-
priate measurement. However, Ambainis et al. [24] and Nayak [25] showed
that if information about an n–bit string X is stored in r qubits and one
is asked about a particular bit of X then in order to err with probability
less than ǫ one needs r > n (1 − h(ǫ)). Thus, asymptotically, in this par-
ticular case, quantum storage does not offer any advantage. Ko¨nig, Maurer
and Renner [1] show that there is no advantage even if one is asked more
general, non-binary, questions about X. This made it possible to make the
connection to privacy amplification.
In the following we provide a detailed and reasonably self-contained de-
scription of the new security proof. In section 3 we introduce the relevant
concepts and methods of probability theory and quantum mechanics. The
main results are presented in section 4. This is followed by applications
of our security criteria to selected quantum key distribution protocols (sec-
tion 5).
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
Let a be a subset of a set I. The characteristic function χa of a on I is the
function from I to {0, 1} defined by χ(i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ a.
Let z = (z1, . . . , zn) be an n-tuple and a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} a set of indices.
Then za denotes the |a|-tuple containing all zi with i ∈ a. For two n-tuples
z = (z1, . . . , zn) and z
′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′
n) of real values, z is said to be majorized
by z′, denoted z ≺ z′, if for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}∑
i∈ak
zi ≤
∑
j∈bk
z′j
where ak and bk are the sets containing the indices of the k largest elements
of z and z′, respectively. A real valued function f on the set of real n-tuples
is said to be Schur-convex if
z ≺ z′ =⇒ f(z) ≤ f(z′)
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for any z and z′.
For a function f on Z, we denote by fmax and fmin the functions on the
power set of Z defined by
fmax(W) = max
z∈W
f(z) and fmin(W) = min
z∈W
f(z) ,
for any W ⊆ Z.
Let δ : Z × Z → R+ be a metric on a set Z. The ε-environment of an
element z ∈ Z is defined by
Bε(z) := {z′ ∈ Z : δ(z, z′) ≤ ε} .
Similarly, the ε-environment of a subset W ⊆ Z is the union of all ε-
environments of elements of W, i.e.,
Bε(W) :=
⋃
z∈W
Bε(z) .
3.2 Elements of Classical Probability and Information The-
ory
The goal of this subsection is to introduce some concepts of probability and
information theory that we will use for the proofs of our main results. For
a more complete overview, we refer to the standard literature (e.g., [26]).
In the following, we use capital letters (Z) for random variables, calli-
graphic letters (Z) for their range, and small letters (z) for the elements
of their range. The probability distribution of a random variable Z is de-
noted by PZ . The expectation over Z of a function f of Z is given by
EZ [f(Z)] :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)f(z). A random variable or probability distribu-
tion is called binary if it has range Z = {0, 1}. We write P binp for the binary
probability distribution with P binp (1) = p.
An n-tuple (Z1, . . . , Zn) of random variables with the same range Z is
called exchangeable if, for all permutations π on {1, . . . , n},
PZ1···Zn = PZpi(1)···Zpi(n)
It is easy to see that, for any n-tuple (Z1, . . . , Zn) of random variables with
range Z, the n-tuple
(Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
n) := (ZΠ(1), . . . , ZΠ(n))
obtained by permuting the indices according to a random permutation Π on
{1, . . . , n} is exchangeable.
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The variational distance between two probability distributions P and Q
over the same range Z is defined by
δ(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
|P (z)−Q(z)| .
The variational distance δ is a metric on the set of probability distributions
with range Z. In particular, δ(P,Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q, it is sym-
metric, and it satisfies the triangle inequality. For random variables Z and
Z ′, we also write δ(Z,Z ′) instead of δ(PZ , PZ′). The variational distance
between two probability distributions P and Q can be interpreted as the
probability that two random experiments described by P and Q, respec-
tively, are different. This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let P and Q be two probability distributions. Then there exists
a pair of random variables Z and Z ′ with joint probability distribution PZZ′
such that PZ = P , PZ′ = Q, and
Prob[Z 6= Z ′] = δ(P,Q) .
It is easy to see that the variational distance between Z and Z ′ can not
increase when applying the same function f on both Z and Z ′, i.e.,
δ(Z,Z ′) ≥ δ(f(Z), f(Z ′)) . (3)
Let [Z,W ] and [Z ′,W ′] be two pairs of random variables, and let PZ|W (·, w) :=
PZ|W=w and PZ′|W ′(·, w) := PZ′|W ′=w be the probability distribution of Z
and Z ′ conditioned on W = w and W ′ = w, respectively. Using the triangle
inequality, it can be shown that∣∣δ(PZW , PZ′,W ′)− EW [δ(PZ|W (·,W ), PZ′|W ′(·,W ))]∣∣ ≤ δ(PW , PW ′) . (4)
Combining this with (3) for the function f : (z, w) 7→ w leads to
EW [δ(PZ|W (·,W ), PZ′|W ′(·,W ))] ≤ 2δ(PZW , PZ′W ′) , (5)
and, similarly, for f : (z, w) 7→ z,
δ(PZ , PZ′) ≤ EW [δ(PZ|W (·,W ), PZ′|W ′(·,W ))] + δ(PW , PW ′) . (6)
Let P be a probability distribution over Z. The non-uniformity of P ,
d(P ) := δ(P,U) ,
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is defined as the variational distance of P from the uniform distribution U
over Z. For a random variable Z with probability distribution PZ , we also
write d(Z) instead of d(PZ). Similarly, for two random variables Z and W ,
the expected non-uniformity of Z given W is defined by
d(Z|W ) := E[d(PZ|W (·,W ))] .
Definition 3.2. Let z := (z1, . . . , zn) be an n-tuple of elements from a set
Z. The frequency distribution Qz of z is the real valued function on Z
defined by
Qz(z) :=
|{i : zi = z}|
n
for z ∈ Z.
It is easy to see that the frequency Qz is a probability distribution on Z,
i.e., Qz(z) ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
z∈ZQz(z) = 1.
Definition 3.3. The probability range of an n-tuple Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) of
random variables with range Z is the smallest convex set P of probability
distributions on Z such that
PZk|Z1=z1,...,Zk−1=zk−1 ∈ P
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and z1, . . . , zn−1 ∈ Z.
The following result of [27] states that the frequency distribution of a
sequence of random variables is with high probability contained in an ε-
environment of its probability range.
Lemma 3.4. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) be an n-tuple of random variables with
alphabet Z of size |Z| = q and let P be the probability range of Z. Then, for
any ε > 0,
Prob[QZ ∈ Bε(P)] ≥ 1− 2qe−nε2/2 .
We will make use of different entropy measures to characterize random
variables or, more precisely, their probability distributions. Let P be a prob-
ability distribution with range Z, support Z+ := {z ∈ Z : P (z) > 0}, and
maximum probability pmax(P ) := maxz∈Z P (z). Then, the Re´nyi entropy
of order α, for α ∈ R+ ∪ {∞},1 is defined by2
Hα(P ) :=
1
1− α log
(∑
z∈Z
P (z)α
)
.
1For α ∈ {0, 1,∞}, Hα(P ) is defined by the limit value limβ→αHβ(P ).
2All logarithms in this paper are binary.
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It turns out that, for α = 1, H1(P ) corresponds to the Shannon entropy
H(P ) = −∑z∈Z+ P (z) log(P (z)). Moreover, for α =∞, we have H∞(P ) =
− log(pmax), which is also called min-entropy, and, for α = 0, H0(P ) =
log(|Z+|). For a random variable Z with probability distribution PZ , we
also write H(Z) instead of H(PZ), and, more generally, for an event E ,
H(Z|E) instead of H(PZ|E).
The Re´nyi entropy of order α of a random variable Z conditioned on
another random variable W is given by
Hα(Z|W ) := min
w∈W
Hα(Z|W = w) (for α > 1)
and
Hα(Z|W ) := max
w∈W
Hα(Z|W = w) (for α < 1) .
We will often be interested in the entropy of a probability distribution
which is close to a given distribution P . This is formalized by the notion of
smooth Re´nyi entropy introduced in [28].
Definition 3.5. Let ε ≥ 0 and α ∈ R+∪{∞}. The ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy
or order α of a probability distribution P is defined by
Hεα(P ) := H
max
α (Bε(P )) (for α > 1)
and
Hεα(P ) := H
min
α (Bε(P )) (for α < 1) .
Similarly, the notion of conditional Re´nyi entropy can be generalized to
smooth Re´nyi entropy. In particular, for α =∞, we have
Hε∞(Z|W ) := max
PZ′W ′ :δ(PZ′W ′ ,PZW )≤ε
H∞(Z ′|W ′) .
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the above definition
for α = 0.
Lemma 3.6. Let Z be a random variable with range Z and let W be a
subset of Z. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
Prob[Z ∈ W] ≥ 1− ε =⇒ Hε0(PZ) ≤ log |W| .
For α = 0, the (smooth) Re´nyi entropy is sub-additive.
Lemma 3.7. Let Z andW be two random variables. Then, for any ε, ε′ > 0,
Hε+ε
′
0 (ZW ) ≤ Hε0(Z) +Hε
′
0 (W ) .
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The min-entropy of a random variable Z when conditioning on another
random variable W cannot decrease more than the Re´nyi entropy of order
zero of W .
Lemma 3.8. Let Z and W be random variables. Then, for any ε, ε′, ε′′ ∈
R
+,
Hε+ε
′+ε′′
∞ (Z|W ) ≥ Hε∞(ZW )−Hε
′
0 (W )− log(
1
ε′′
) .
Lemma 3.9. Let Z be an exchangeable n-tuple of random variables with
range Z. Then
H∞(Z|QZ = Q) ≥ nH(Q)− |Z|(log(n) + 1) .
Proof. By the definition of exchangeability, PZ|QZ=Q is the uniform distri-
bution over the set of all n-tuples z with Qz = Q. It is easy to see that there
are
NQ :=
n!∏
z∈Z(nQ(z))!
such tuples, i.e., we haveH∞(Z|QZ = Q) = − log pmax(PZ|QZ=Q) = log(NQ).
The assertion then follows from a straightforward calculation using Stirling’s
approximation
√
2πmm+
1
2 e−m ≤ m! ≤ mm+ 12 e−m+1 ,
for any m ∈ N.
The notion of typical sets is widely used in information theory. Note
that the following definition slightly differs from the one given in [26].
Definition 3.10. Let Z be a set, n ∈ N, and r ≥ 0. The r-typical set over
Zn is defined as
T nZ (r) := {z ∈ Zn : H(Qz) ≤ r} .
Lemma 3.11. For any set Z of size |Z| = q, n,∈ N, and r ≥ 0,
|T nZ (r)| ≤ 2nrnq−1 .
Proof. Let Q := {Qz : z ∈ Zn} be the set of frequency distributions of
n-tuples over Z and, for any Qˆ ∈ Q, let S(Qˆ) := {z ∈ Zn : Qz = Qˆ} be
the set of n-tuples z = (z1, . . . , zn) with frequency distribution Qˆ. We first
show that, for any Qˆ ∈ Q,
|S(Qˆ)| ≤ 2nH(Qˆ) . (7)
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Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) be an n-tuple of independent random variables Zi
distributed according to Qˆ. Since, for any n-tuple z in S(Qˆ), each symbol z
occurs nQˆ(z) times in z, we find
1 ≥ Prob[Z ∈ S(Qˆ)] = |S(Qˆ)|
∏
z∈Z
Qˆ(z)nQˆ(z) = |S(Qˆ)|2
∑
z∈Z nQˆ(z) log(Qˆ(z))
which implies (7). The assertion of the lemma then follows from
|T nZ (r)| =
∑
Qˆ∈Q:H(Qˆ)≤r
|S(Qˆ)| ≤
∑
Qˆ∈Q:H(Qˆ)≤r
2nH(Qˆ) ≤ |Q| 2nr
and the observation that |Q| ≤ nq−1.
Definition 3.12. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and let I be a set. A p-random selection A
on I is a random variable describing the subset obtained by independently
picking each element of I with probability p, i.e., for any a ⊆ I,
PA(a) =
∏
i∈I
P binp (χa(i))
where χa be the characteristic function of a on I.
A random function G from X to Y is called two-universal if Prob[G(x) =
G(x′)] ≤ 1|Y| holds for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X . In particular, G is two-
universal if, for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X , the random variables G(x) and
G(x′) are independent and uniformly distributed. For instance, the uniform
random function from a set X to a set Y is two-universal.3
3.3 Elements of Quantum Theory
In this section, we introduce some basic concepts of quantum theory which
we will use. For a more complete overview we refer to the standard literature
(e.g., [31]).
Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension d. We denote by S(H) the set
of density operators on H, i.e., S(H) is the set of positive operators ρ on H
with tr(ρ) = 1. For any ρ ∈ S(H), let λ(ρ) be the d-tuple of eigenvalues of ρ
3In the literature, two-universality is usually defined for families G of functions: A
family G is called two-universal if the random function G with uniform distribution over
G is two-universal. Non-trivial examples of two-universal families G of functions can, e.g.,
be found in [29] and [30].
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(e.g., in decreasing order). The trace distance between two density operators
ρ and σ on the same Hilbert space H is defined by
δ(ρ, σ) :=
1
2
tr(|ρ− σ|) .
We will use several well-known properties of the trace distance (for proofs,
see e.g. [31]).
The trace distance can be seen as a generalization of the variational
distance to density operators. Many of the properties of the variational dis-
tance thus also hold for the trace distance. In particular, the trace distance
is a metric on S(H).
Moreover, for two probability distributions P and Q over W and two
families of density operators {ρw}w∈W and {σw}w∈W ,
δ(
∑
w∈W
P (w)ρw,
∑
w∈W
Q(w)σw) ≤
∑
w∈W
P (w) δ(ρw , σw) + δ(P,Q) . (8)
This inequality can be seen as the quantum analogue of (6). The trace
distance between two pure states ρ = |φ〉〈φ| and σ = |ψ〉〈ψ| can easily be
computed explicitly,
δ(ρ, σ) =
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2 =
√
1− tr(ρσ) . (9)
Let F be a positive operator valued measure (POVM) on a Hilbert space
H, i.e., F = {Fz}z∈Z is a family of positive operators on H such that∑
z∈Z Fz = id. We say that F is orthogonal if there exists an orthonormal
basis {|z〉}z∈Z of H such that Fz = |z〉〈z|, for any z ∈ Z.
Definition 3.13. Let F = {Fz}z∈Z be a POVM on a Hilbert space H.
The measurement mapping γF of F is the function mapping each density
operator ρ ∈ S(H) to the probability distribution P = γF (ρ) on Z defined
by P (z) := tr(Fzρ). The probability range PF of F is the range of γF , i.e.,
PF := γF (S(H)).
For a POVM F = {Fz}z∈Z on a Hilbert space H and a probability
distribution P on Z, we write γ−1F (P ) to denote the set of density operators
ρ on H such that γF (ρ) = P . More generally, for a set P of probability
distributions, γ−1F (P) :=
⋃
P∈P γ
−1
F (P ) is the set of density operators ρ with
γF (ρ) ∈ P
The trace distance between two density operators ρ and σ turns out
to be an upper bound for the variational distance between the probability
distributions of the outcomes of the same measurement F applied to ρ and
σ.
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Lemma 3.14. Let F be a POVM on a Hilbert space H and let ρ, σ ∈ S(H).
Then
δ(γF (ρ), γF (σ)) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) .
The probability distribution resulting from an orthogonal measurement
of a quantum state ρ is in a certain sense less ordered than the eigenvalues
of ρ. This is formalized by the following lemma. A proof can, for instance,
be found in [32] (see also [33]).
Lemma 3.15 (Schur’s majorization theorem). Let F = {F1, . . . , Fd}
be an orthogonal measurement on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. Then, for
any density operator ρ ∈ S(H),
p ≺ λ(ρ)
where p = (γF (ρ)(1), . . . , γF (ρ)(d)) are the probabilities of the outcomes
when measuring ρ with respect to F .
Let H⊗H′ be a bipartite Hilbert space, let ρ ∈ S(H⊗H′), and let Z be
the outcome of a measurement of ρ with respect to a POVM F = {Fz}z∈Z on
(a subspace of) H′. The density operator on H resulting from conditioning
ρ on the measurement outcome Z = z, denoted ρHz←F , is given by
ρHz←F :=
1
c
trH′(idH ⊗ Fz ρ)
where c := tr(idH⊗Fz ρ) is a normalization constant and where trH′ denotes
the partial trace over the subspace H′.
Let H⊗n := H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn be the product of n identical factor spaces
Hi = H. The following definition can be seen as a quantum version of
Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.16. The density range of a density operator ρ ∈ H⊗n is the
smallest convex subset P of S(H) such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for any
POVM Fk−1 = {Fz}z∈Z on Hk−1 :=
⊗k−1
i=1 Hi, and for any z ∈ Z, the
density operator ρHk
z←Fk−1 is contained in P.
Let E be a quantum operation E on a Hilbert space H, i.e., E = {Ez}z∈Z
is a family of linear operators Ez onH such that
∑
z∈Z E
†
zEz = id. Then, the
density operator σ = E(ρ) resulting from applying E to a density operator ρ
is given by
σ :=
∑
z∈Z
EzρE
†
z .
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Lemma 3.17. Let ρ be a density operator on H and let σ := E(ρ) be the
density operator resulting from applying a quantum operation E = {Ez}z∈Z
to ρ. Then
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1−
∑
z∈Z
|tr(Ezρ)|2 .
Proof. We first show that the assertion of the lemma holds if ρ = |φ〉〈φ|
is a pure state. For z ∈ Z, let pz := tr(EzρE†z), |ψz〉 := 1√pzEz|φ〉, and
σz := |ψz〉〈ψz|. Note that pz ∈ [0, 1],
∑
z pz = 1, and
σ =
∑
z∈Z
pzσz .
We can thus apply (8) yielding
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
∑
z∈Z
pzδ(ρ, σz) . (10)
Since, ρ = |φ〉〈φ| and σz = |ψz〉〈ψz| are pure states, it follows from (9) that
δ(ρ, σz) =
√
1− |〈φ|ψz〉|2 =
√
1− 1
pz
|tr(Ezρ)|2 .
Combining this with (10), we find
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
∑
z∈Z
pz
√
1− 1
pz
|tr(Ezρ)|2 ≤
√∑
z∈Z
pz
(
1− 1
pz
|tr(Ezρ)|2
)
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of the square root
and Jensen’s inequality. This concludes the proof of the lemma for pure
states ρ.
To verify that the assertion of the lemma also holds for mixed states ρ,
write ρ as a convex combination of pure states ρw, i.e., ρ =
∑
w∈W qwρw
for appropriate qw ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
w∈W qw = 1, and let E(ρw) be the state
resulting from applying the quantum operation E on ρw. Then, since σ =
E(ρ) =∑w∈W qwE(ρw), inequality (8) yields
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
∑
w∈W
qwδ(ρw, E(ρw)) ≤
∑
w∈W
qw
√
1−
∑
z∈Z
|tr(Ezρw)|2
where the last inequality follows from the statement of the lemma applied
to the pure states ρw. Using again Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1−
∑
z∈Z
∑
w∈W
qw|tr(Ezρw)|2 ≤
√
1−
∑
z∈Z
|tr(Ez
∑
w∈W
qwρw)|2
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which concludes the proof.
We will now use Lemma 3.17 to derive a lower bound for the variational
distance between two probability distributions in terms of the trace distance
between two corresponding density operators. This is in a certain sense the
converse of Lemma 3.14.
Lemma 3.18. Let F = {Fz}z∈Z be an orthogonal POVM on a Hilbert space
H, let ρ ∈ S(H), let P := γF (ρ), and let Q be a probability distribution on
Z. Then there exists σ ∈ S(H) such that
Q = γF (σ) (11)
and
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
2δ(P,Q) . (12)
In particular,
Bε(γF (ρ)) ⊆ γF (B
√
2ε(ρ)) . (13)
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, there exist random variables Z and Z ′ distributed
according to P and Q, respectively, such that
Prob[Z 6= Z ′] = δ := δ(P,Q) .
LetW := {(z, z′) ∈ Z×Z : z 6= z′}, let pz,z′ := PZ′|Z(z′, z), and let {|z〉}z∈Z
be an orthonormal basis of H such that Fz = |z〉〈z|. Let
E0 :=
∑
z∈Z
√
pz,z|z〉〈z| ,
and, for (z, z′) ∈ W,
Ez,z′ :=
√
pz,z′|z′〉〈z| ,
be linear operators on H. It is easy to verify that the family E = {E0} ∪
{Ez,z′}(z,z′)∈W is a quantum operation, i.e.,
E†0E0 +
∑
(z,z′)∈W
E†z,z′Ez,z′ = id .
Let
σ := E(ρ) = E0ρE†0 +
∑
(z,z′)∈W
Ez,z′ρE
†
z,z′
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be the quantum state resulting from applying E to ρ. It then follows from a
straightforward calculation that
γF (σ) = PZ′
which implies (11) since PZ′ = Q. To show that also (12) holds, we use
Lemma 3.17 yielding
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− |tr(E0ρ)|2 −
∑
(z,z′)∈W
|tr(Ez,z′ρ)|2 ≤
√
1− |tr(E0ρ)|2 .
Since PZ = γF (ρ), we have
tr(E0ρ) =
∑
z∈Z
√
pz,zγF (ρ)(z) ≥
∑
z∈Z
pz,zPZ(z) = Prob[Z = Z
′] = 1− δ ,
and thus
δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− (1− δ)2 =
√
2δ − δ2 ≤
√
2δ .
The entropy of a quantum state can be defined in terms of the entropy
of a classical probability distribution. Let ρ be a density operator on a
d-dimensional Hilbert space H and let (λ1, . . . , λd) := λ(ρ) be the d eigen-
values of ρ. Note that there exists an orthonormal basis {|1〉, . . . |d〉} of
ρ (namely the eigenbasis) such that λi = P (i) where P := γF (ρ) is the
probability distribution of a measurement of ρ with respect to the POVM
F = {|1〉〈1|, . . . , |d〉〈d|}. In particular λ(ρ) can be interpreted as a proba-
bility distribution on {1, . . . , d}.
The Re´nyi entropy (of order α) of a density operator ρ is defined by
the Re´nyi entropy of λ(ρ), i.e., Sα(ρ) := Hα(λ(ρ)), for α ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}. In
particular, for α = 1, S(ρ) := S1(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ. Note
that, for α = 0,
S0(ρ) = log(rank(ρ)) .
The smooth Re´nyi entropy for density operators can be defined by general-
izing the classical Definition 3.5.
Definition 3.19. Let ε ≥ 0 and α ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}. The ε-smooth Re´nyi
entropy of order α of a density operator ρ is defined by
Sα(ρ) := S
max
α (Bε(ρ)) (for α > 1) and Sα(ρ) := Sminα (Bε(ρ)) (for α < 1) .
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The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.15 and the fact
that the entropy functions −Hα are Schur-convex.
Lemma 3.20. Let F be an orthogonal POVM on a d-dimensional Hilbert
space. Then, for any density operator ρ ∈ S(H) and any α ∈ R+ ∪ {∞},
Sα(ρ) ≤ Hα(γF (ρ)) .
We often will use this result for the case α = 1. To simplify the notation,
let
SF (ρ) := H(γF (ρ)). (14)
be the Shannon entropy of the outcomes when measuring a density operator
ρ ∈ S(H) with respect to a POVM F . If F corresponds to a measurement
in an eigenbasis of ρ, we obviously have S(ρ) = SF (ρ), and thus, from
Lemma 3.20,
S(ρ) = min
F
SF (ρ) (15)
where the minimum is taken over all orthogonal POVMs F in H.
The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 3.20 to smooth Re´nyi
entropy.
Lemma 3.21. Let F be an orthogonal POVM on a Hilbert space H. Then,
for any density operator ρ ∈ S(H). Then, for any density operator ρ, α < 1,
and ε ≥ 0,
S
√
2ε
α (ρ) ≤ Hεα(γF (ρ)) .
Proof. From Lemma 3.20, we have
S
√
2ε
α (ρ) = inf
σ∈B
√
2ε(ρ)
Sα(σ) ≤ inf
σ∈B
√
2ε(ρ)
Hα(γF (σ)) .
The assertion then follows from Lemma 3.18,
inf
σ∈B
√
2ε(ρ)
Hα(γF (σ)) ≤ inf
Q∈Bε(γF (ρ))
Hα(Q) = H
ε
α(γF (ρ)) .
4 Main Result
This section contains the main result of the paper, namely, an explicit ex-
pression for the rate of secure quantum key distribution (cf. equation (22)).
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In the first part, we derive Lemma 4.1 which says that the frequency distri-
bution obtained when measuring the subsystems of an n-partite quantum
state with respect to a certain POVM F¯ can be estimated from the results
obtained by applying another POVM F on a few randomly chosen subsys-
tems. This is then used to show Lemma 4.2 which gives an upper bound
for the Re´nyi entropy of order 0 of the outcomes when applying the POVM
F given only the outcomes of the measurements with respect to F¯ on a
few (randomly chosen) subsystems. The result is then applied to bound
the size (rank) of the n-partite quantum system given the outcomes of a
measurement on a few subsystems (Corollary 4.3).
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we review information reconciliation and the
security of privacy amplification in the presence of a quantum adversary,
respectively. These are main ingredients of the post–processing stage.
In Section 4.4, we introduce the generic quantum key distribution pro-
tocol and prove its security by combining the above mentioned results with
the information reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain our main
result, i.e., the secret key rate (22).
4.1 Parameter Estimation
Let H be a Hilbert space, let ρ ∈ S(H⊗n), let a ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and let
F = {Fz}z∈Z be a POVM on H. Then ΓaF (ρ) denotes the |a|-tuple Zˆ of
outcomes resulting from applying F to ρ on Ha, where Ha is the tensor
product of the factor spaces Hi, for i ∈ a.
Lemma 4.1. Let ρ ∈ S(H⊗n) be an n-partite state with density range R ⊆
S(H), let F = {Fz}z∈Z and F¯ = {F¯z}z∈Z¯ be two POVMs on H, and let A
be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Let ZA := ΓAF (ρ) and ZA¯ := ΓA¯F¯ (ρ)
be the outcomes when measuring ρ in HA and HA¯ with respect to F and F¯ ,
respectively. Then, for any ε > 0,
Prob
[∃ρˆ ∈ R : p δ(QZA , γF (ρˆ)) + (1− p) δ(QZA¯ , γF¯ (ρˆ)) ≤ ε] ≥ 1− µ
where µ := 2|Z|+|Z¯|e−
nε2
8 .
Proof. Let G be the POVM on H obtained by combining F and F¯ with
probability p and 1− p, respectively, i.e., G := {G(z,r)}(z,r)∈(Z∪Z¯)×{0,1} with
G(z,1) := pFz and G(z,0) := (1 − p)F¯z. Let W := ΓG(ρ) be the n-tuple
of outcomes (Zi, Ri) when measuring ρ with respect to G. The random
variables occurring in the lemma can then equivalently be defined by A :=
{i : Ri = 1}, ZA := (Z1, . . . , Zn)A, and ZA¯ := (Z1, . . . , Zn)A¯.
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The probability range of the n-tupleW is contained in P := γG(R). We
can thus apply Lemma 3.4 for ε¯ := ε/2 leading to
Prob[QW ∈ Bε¯(P)] ≥ 1− µ .
Let z ∈ (Z ∪ Z¯)n and a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the n-tuple w of values
wi = (zi, χa(i)) satisfies Qw ∈ Bε¯(P), i.e.,
δ(Qw, γG(ρˆ)) ≤ ε/2
for some ρˆ ∈ R. It remains to be shown that this implies
p δ(Qza , γF (ρˆ)) + (1− p) δ(Qza¯ , γF¯ (ρˆ)) ≤ ε . (16)
Let (Z,R) and (Z ′, R′) be two pairs of random variables distributed accord-
ing to γG(ρˆ) and Qw, respectively. It follows from the construction of the
POVM G that PR = P binp , PZ|R=1 = γF (ρˆ), and PZ|R=0 = γF¯ (ρˆ). More-
over, by the definition of the frequency distribution, PZ′|R′=1 = Qza and
PZ′|R′=0 = Qza¯ . Hence, using (5),
p δ(γF (ρˆ), Qza) + (1− p) δ(γF¯ (ρˆ), Qza¯) = ER[PZ|R(·, R), PZ′|R′(·, R)]
≤ 2δ(PZR, PZ′R′) = 2δ(γG(ρˆ), Qw) ≤ ε .
which implies (16) and thus concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.2. Let ρ ∈ S(H⊗n) be an n-partite state with density range R ⊆
S(H), let F = {Fz}z∈Z and F¯ = {F¯z}z∈Z¯ be two POVMs on H, let A be
a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}, and let ZA := ΓAF (ρ), ZA¯ := ΓA¯F¯ (ρ).
Then, for any ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
E[µ(QZA , A)] ≤ 2|Z|+|Z
′|e−
nε2
2
such that, for any probability distribution Qˆ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
H
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (ZA¯|QZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ |a¯|Hmax(B(Qˆ)) + log(|a¯|)(|Z¯ | − 1) ,
where B(Qˆ) := Bε/(1−p)(γF¯ (R ∩ γ−1F (Bε/p(Qˆ)))).
Proof. LetW be the set of pairs (z, a) consisting of an n-tuple z of elements
from Z ∪ Z¯ and a subset a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that there exists a density
operator ρˆ ∈ R satisfying
p δ(Qza , γF (ρˆ)) + (1− p) δ(Qza¯ , γF¯ (ρˆ)) ≤ ε .
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For any probability distribution Qˆ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let
C(Qˆ, a) := {za¯ : (z, a) ∈ W and Qza = Qˆ} .
We first show that
log(|C(Qˆ, a)|) ≤ |a¯|Hmax(B(Qˆ)) + log(|a¯|)(|Z| − 1) , (17)
for any Qˆ and a. It follows from the definition of the set C(Qˆ, a) that
for any z′ ∈ C(Qˆ, a) there exists ρˆ ∈ R such that δ(Qˆ, γF (ρˆ)) ≤ ε/p and
δ(Qz′ , γG(ρˆ)) ≤ ε/(1 − p) . which directly implies Qz′ ∈ B(Qˆ) and thus
H(Qz′) ≤ r := Hmax(B)(Qˆ)) .
Hence, by Definition 3.10, z′ is contained in the r-typical set T kZ (r) for
k := |a¯|. By Lemma 3.11 the size of T kZ (r) can not be larger than 2kr|a||Z|−1,
from which (17) follows.
Lemma 4.1 gives a lower bound for the probability that (Z, A) is con-
tained in W,
Prob[(Z, A) ∈ W] ≥ 1− 2|Z|+|Z¯|e−np
2
8 .
Let the function µ be defined by
µ(Qˆ, a) := 1− Prob[ZA¯ ∈ C(QZA , A)|QZA = Qˆ, A = a] .
Then, since Prob[ZA¯ ∈ C(QZA , A)|] ≥ Prob[(Z, A) ∈ W], we obtain
E[µ(QZA , A)] = 1− Prob[ZA¯ ∈ C(QZA , A)|] ≤ 22qe−
nε2
8 .
On the other hand, from Lemma 3.6,
H
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (ZA¯|ZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ log(|C(Qˆ, a)|)
for any Qˆ and a. Combining this with (17) concludes the proof.
Corollary 4.3. Let ρ ∈ S(H⊗n) be an n-partite state with density range
R ⊆ S(H), let F = {Fz}z∈Z be a POVM on H, let F¯ be an orthogonal
POVM on H, and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Let ZA :=
ΓAF (ρ) be the outcomes when measuring ρ in HA with respect to F and let
ρA¯ be the remaining quantum state in HA¯. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists
a real valued function µ with
E[µ(QZA , A)] ≤ 2
dim(H)+|Z|
2 e−
nε2
16
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such that, for any probability distribution Qˆ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
S
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (ρA¯|QZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ |a¯|Hmax(B(Qˆ)) + log(|a¯|)(dim(H)− 1) ,
where B(Qˆ) := Bε/(1−p)(γF¯ (R ∩ γ−1F (Bε/p(Qˆ)))).
Proof. Since the POVM F¯ = {F¯z}z∈Z¯ is orthogonal, we have |Z¯ | = dim(H).
According to Lemma 4.2, there exists a function µ¯ satisfying
E[µ¯(QZA , A)] ≤ 2dim(H)+|Z|e−
nε2
8
such that
H
µ¯(Qˆ,a)
0 (QZA¯ |QZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ |a¯|Hmax(B(Qˆ)) + log(|a¯|)(dim(H)− 1)
(18)
holds. Let the function µ be defined by µ(Qˆ, a) :=
√
2µ¯(Qˆ, a). Using
Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
E[µ(QZA , A)] ≤
√
2E[µ¯(QZA , A)] ≤ 2
dim(H)+|Z|
2 e−
nε2
16 .
On the other hand, since F¯ is orthogonal, Lemma 3.21 implies that
S
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (ρA¯|QZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ H µ¯(Qˆ,a)0 (ZA¯|QZA = Qˆ, A = a)
for any Qˆ and a which, together with (18), concludes the proof.
Corollary 4.4. Let Z be a set and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}.
Then, for any n-tuple Z of random variables with range Z and any ε > 0,
there exists a real valued function µ with
E[µ(QZA , A)] ≤ 22|Z|e−
nε2
2
such that, for any probability distribution Qˆ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
H
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (ZA¯|QZA = Qˆ, A = a) ≤ |a¯|Hmax(Bε/p(1−p)(Qˆ)) + log(|a¯|)(|Z| − 1) .
Corollary 4.5. Let X and Y be n-tuples of random variables with range X
and Y, respectively, and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Then,
for any y ∈ Yn and ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
E[µ(QXA|YA , A)] ≤ |Y|22|X |e−
nε3
2
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such that, for any channel Qˆ from Y to X and for any set a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
H
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (XA¯|QXA|YA = Qˆ,Y = y, A = a) ≤ n (r+ε|Y| log(|X |))+log(n)(|X |−1) .
where
r :=
∑
y∈Y
QY(y)H
max(Bε/p(1−p)(Qˆ(·|y))) .
Proof. Let Y ′ be the subset of Y containing all values y such that Qy(y) ≥
εn. For any y ∈ Y, let
ay := {i : yi = y} ,
and, for any y ∈ Y ′, let µy be the function defined by Corollary 4.4 ap-
plied to the tuple Xay . In particular, we have, for y ∈ Y ′, any probability
distribution Qˆ′ on X , and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
hy := H
µy(Qˆ′,a∩ay)
0 (XA¯∩ay |QXA∩ay = Qˆ′, A = a) ≤ |ay| ry + log(n)(|X | − 1) .
where ry := H
max(Bε/p(1−p)(Qˆ)). On the other hand, for y ∈ Y − Y ′, let
hy := H0(XA¯∩ay |QXA∩ay = Qˆ′, A = a) ≤ |ay| log(|X |) ≤ nε log(|X |)
Applying Lemma 3.7 yields
H
µ(Qˆ,a)
0 (XA¯|QXA|YA = Qˆ,Y = y, A = a) ≤
∑
y∈Y
hy
for
µ(Qˆ, a) :=
∑
y∈Y ′
µy(Qˆ(·|y), a ∩ ay)
from which the assertion follows.
4.2 Information Reconciliation
Lemma 4.6. Let Z be a random variable with Hε0(Z) ≤ r and let F be a
two-universal hash function from Z to {0, 1}s. Then there exists a guessing
function g such that
Prob[g(F,F (Z)) = Z] ≥ 1− 2−(s−r) + ε
For a proof, see e.g. [34].
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4.3 Privacy Amplification Against Quantum Adversaries
We will use the following theorem proven in [1].
Theorem 4.7. Let Z be a random variable with Hε∞(Z) ≥ n and let ρ ∈
S(H) be a density operator with Sε′0 (ρ) ≤ r which depends on X. Let F be
a two-universal hash function from Z to {0, 1}s and let W := ΓG(ρ) be the
outcome of a measurement of ρ with respect to an arbitrary POVM G which
might depend on F . Then
d(F (Z)|WF ) ≤ 3
4
2−
n−r−s
2 + ε+ ε′ .
4.4 A Generic Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
In this section, we will describe the generic protocol and apply the results
from the previous sections to prove its security. To enhance the readability
of this exposition, we will restrict our attention to the asymptotic behavior
of the relevant quantities. The exact statements about eventual constants
may be taken directly from the lemmas that we refer to.
Let ρ be a density operator on (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n. Let F and G be two
POVMs on HA and let F ′ and G′ be two POVMs on HB. Let T and T ′
be two p-random selections on {1, . . . , n}. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Xi be
the outcome of a measurement of the subsystem (HA)i with respect to F ,
if i ∈ T , or with respect to G, otherwise. Similarly, let Yi be the outcome of
a measurement of (HB)i with respect to F ′, if i ∈ T ′, or with respect to G′,
otherwise. Let S be a p-random selection on TA.
For the following asymptotic analysis, we assume that p = Θ(n−α) for
some α ∈ (0, 1). In particular, pn grows less than linearly in n.
4.4.1 Parameter Estimation
The goal of this protocol phase is to estimate the parameters used for the
subsequent information reconciliation and privacy amplification phase. In
particular, Alice and Bob have to determine the minimum length r of the
error correcting information needed and the maximum length s of the final
key such that it is guaranteed to be secure.
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Alice Bob
S, T , X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) T
′, Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
✲
S, T,XS∪T PXY := Qˆ(XS∩T ′ ,YS∩T ′),
R := R(XT∩T ′ ,YT∩T ′)
✛
r, s, T ′
r := ⌈nH(X|Y )⌉
t := ⌊nH(X)⌋
u := ⌈nmaxρˆ∈R S(ρˆ)⌉
s := t− r − u
X′ := XS∪T∪T ′ Y
′ := XS∪T∪T ′
The functions Qˆ and R are defined as follows. Let x = (x1, . . . , xk) and
y = (y1, . . . , yk) be two k-tuples. Then Qˆ(x,y) is the frequency distribu-
tion Qz of the k-tuple z = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)). Similarly, R := R(x,y)
is the set of density operators on HA ⊗ HB such that the outcomes of a
measurement of any ρˆ ∈ R with respect to F ⊗F ′ are distributed according
to Qˆ(x,y).
Note that T ∩ T ′ is a p2-random selection on {1, . . . , n} and that S ∩ T ′
is a p2(1− p)-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Corollary 4.4 implies that
Hε0(X
′|Y = y, C) ≤ Hε0(XS∩T ′) = nH(X|Y ) + o(n) (19)
holds for ε exponentially small in n. Similarly, Lemma 3.9 implies
Hε∞(X
′|C) = Hε∞(XT∩T ′) + o(n) = nH(X) + o(n) . (20)
4.4.2 Information Reconciliation
Let n′ := n − |S ∪ T ∪ T ′| be the length of the tuples X′ and Y′, and let,
for some r′ ≤ n′, Hr′ := H(X n′ → {0, 1}r′) be the set of two-universal hash
functions mapping X′ to r′ bits.
Alice Bob
F ∈R Hr′ ✲F,F (X
′)
X¯′: guess X′ from Y′
It follows from Lemma 4.6 and (19) that for some r′ = r + o(n) ≤
nH(X|Y )+o(n), X′ = X¯′ holds except with probability exponentially small
26
in n. Moreover, since F is independent of X′ and since H0(F (X ′)) = r′,
Lemma 3.8 together with (20) implies
Hε
′
∞(X
′|C,C ′) ≥ Hε∞(X′|C)− r′ + o(n) = nH(X)− r′ + o(n) (21)
where C ′ := (F,F (X′)) are the messages sent by Alice during the informa-
tion reconciliation protocol.
4.4.3 Privacy Amplification
Let P be the set of permutations of the n′ elements ofX′ and for some s′ ≤ n′
let Hs′ := H(X n′ → {0, 1}s′ ) be a two-universal hash function mapping X′
to s′ bits.
Alice Bob
P ∈ P, G ∈R Hs′ ✲P,G
S := G(X′) S′ := G(P (X¯′))
Since X′ = X′′ holds except with probability exponentially small in n,
we have S = S′.
It follows from Corollary 4.3 and (21) that for some s′ = s+ o(n),
Hε
′
∞(X
′|C,C ′)−Hε0(ρ)− s′ ≥ nH(X)− r′ − nmax
ρˆ∈R
S(ρˆ)− s′ + o(n)
is smaller than zero. Theorem 4.7 thus implies that the knowledge of Eve
about the key S is negligible.
Note that the length s′ of the final key is t− r − u + o(n). The rate R
of this generic protocol is thus given by
R = I(X;Y )−max
ρˆ∈R
S(ρˆ) . (22)
Note further that we can carry out the same analysis for the difference
Hε
′
∞(X′|C,W )−Hε0(ρ|W ) where we condition on additional information W .
This might improve the rate R with a clever choice of the information W as
we will see in the next section.
5 Examples
In the following we will illustrate our result by calculating the secret key
rate and the tolerable error rates for common quantum key distribution
protocols.
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5.1 BB84 (The Four–State Protocol)
The BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [3] belongs to the class of
so-called prepare and measure protocols. In this protocol, Alice chooses
randomly, with probability (1−p), the first out of a set of two conjugate bases
of a qubit, the second basis is chosen with probability p. She then prepares
one of the orthogonal basis states, each chosen with equal probability, and
sends the quantum state to Bob. 4
The BB84 protocol can be regarded as an entanglement based protocol
and is in this version known as BBM92 [36]. The preparation stage on Alice’s
side is then given by a measurement on one half of an entangled quantum
state whose second part is sent off to Bob. The relevant quantum state ρ
is a two qubit state, ρ ∈ S(C2 ⊗ C2) and we denote measurement basis one
by {|0〉, |1〉} and basis two by {|+〉, |−〉}, where |±〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). It
is understood that e.g. 〈01|ρ|01〉 corresponds to the probability that Alice
obtains outcome 0 and Bob outcome 1 when both choose to measure in the
first basis. We further identify |+〉 with outcome 0 and |−〉 with outcome 1.
After the phase, where the transmission of the quantum states and the
measurements have been finished, both parties publicly announce the bases
in which they conducted their measurements. They discard the cases in
which they did not measure in the same basis. On a small subset of the
remaining data, they compare a small part of the string to obtain an estimate
of the error rate. Let us assume that the error rate for measurements in both
basis are the same and equal to ǫ. If this is not the case, Alice and Bob can
always randomly flip some of the bits of the set with the lower error rate in
order to make the error probabilities of both sets equal.
The entropy of Alice’s string X equals H(X) = 1 and the conditional en-
tropy of X given Y is given by H(X|Y ) = h(ǫ). The von Neumann entropy
of ρ can be estimated as follows. Note that for all projective measurements
on ρ with outcome given by a random variable Z, H(Z) ≥ S(ρ). Using
Alice’s and Bob’s data, we want to construct the data that a Bell measure-
ment, saved in the random variable Z had resulted in. Let us define the Bell
states
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)
4The original proposal by Bennett and Brassard fixes p = 1
2
. A more efficient protocol,
which achieves twice the key generation rate of the original proposal, can be obtained
by choosing the two bases with different probabilities [35]. We choose p = Θ(n−α), for
α ∈ (0, 1) and n the number of transmitted qubits (see also section 4.4) .
28
and express the probabilities of Z, denoted by λi, in terms of the prob-
abilities of measurements in basis one and basis two:
λ1 := 〈ψ+|ρ|ψ+〉 = 〈++ |ρ|++〉+ 〈− − |ρ| − −〉 − 〈φ+|ρ|φ+〉 (23)
λ2 := 〈ψ−|ρ|ψ−〉 = 〈+− |ρ|+−〉+ 〈−+ |ρ| −+〉 − 〈φ−|ρ|φ−〉 (24)
λ3 := 〈φ+|ρ|φ+〉 = 〈01|ρ|01〉 + 〈10|ρ|10〉 − 〈φ−|ρ|φ−〉 (25)
λ4 := 〈φ−|ρ|φ−〉 . (26)
The symmetric error probability ǫ yields
〈00|ρ|00〉 + 〈11|ρ|11〉 = 1− ǫ
〈++ |ρ|++〉+ 〈− − |ρ| − −〉 = 1− ǫ
〈+− |ρ|+−〉+ 〈−+ |ρ| −+〉 = ǫ
〈01|ρ|01〉 + 〈10|ρ|10〉 = ǫ
and can be inserted into eqs. (23)-(26). We obtain
λ3 = ǫ− λ4 (27)
λ2 = ǫ− λ4 (28)
λ1 = 1− ǫ− λ3 = 1− 2ǫ+ λ4 . (29)
It remains to find the value of the free parameter λ4 ∈ [0, ǫ] such that
H(Z) is maximized. It can easily be shown that this is the case for λ4 = ǫ
2
with H(Z) = 2h(ǫ).
The rate R of the protocol according to eq. (22) is given by
R = H(X)−H(X|Y )−H(Z) = 1− 3h(ǫ)
The security threshold is the highest value of ǫ such that the rate R is
positive and is henceforth the solution to the equation 1 − 3h(ǫ) = 0. We
obtain ǫ ≈ 0.061 which corresponds to a 6.1% bit error rate. Conversely,
there exists a quantum state ρ for which this rate is achieved and it is given
by the mixture
ρ = λ1|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ λ2|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ λ3|φ+〉〈φ+|+ λ4|φ−〉〈φ−| (30)
Making use of the remark at the end of section 4.4.3, we can improve this
security threshold. To do so, we introduce a random variable W = X ⊕ Y ,
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which contains the information about the error positions. The min entropy
of the string X does not decrease, whereas the size of the quantum data
does, thus improving the key rate R. This can be seen as follows: given
the fact that Alice and Bob measured in bases number one/two and that an
error/no error and has occurred, the quantum system can be divided into
4 subsystems. The subsystems in the case of one error/no error contain a
fraction of ǫ2 and
1−ǫ
2 of the total number of qubits, respectively. For each
of the systems the entropy can be estimated separately. If no error occurred
we obtain h(1−2ǫ+λ41−ǫ ) and if an error occurred we get h(
ǫ−λ4
ǫ ). Averaging
over the four systems gives
(1− ǫ)h
(
1− 2ǫ+ λ4
1− ǫ
)
+ ǫh
(
ǫ− λ4
ǫ
)
= H(Z)− h(ǫ)
The key rate for BB84 is thus given by R = 1 − 2h(ǫ) and the security
threshold ǫ ≈ 0.1100 is the solution to the equation 1−2h(ǫ) = 0. The same
rate has previously been obtained by Shor and Preskill [19].
5.2 The Six–State Protocol
The six–state protocol [37, 38] is similar to the BB84 protocol, but makes
use of a third basis on either side. This additional basis is defined as
{ 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)} and conjugate to the other bases 5. This
protocol admits higher symmetry, since the six states that are sent are sym-
metrically distributed on the Bloch sphere. Similarly to the derivation of
eqs. (27)-(29), we easily derive the following additional constraint on the
eigenvalues
λ3 = ǫ− λ2
which results in λ1 = 1 − 3/2ǫ and λi = ǫ/2 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4} corresponding
to a security threshold of 6.8% with corresponding state
ρ = λ1|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ λ2|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ λ3|φ+〉〈φ+|+ λ4|φ−〉〈φ−| (31)
= (1− 2ǫ)|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ 2ǫ1
4
(32)
Another way to derive this result uses the average fidelity F¯ of a qubit
quantum channel. It can be shown [39] to be equal to the average fidelity
of the six states. Here, the fidelity of each state equals 1 − ǫ and therefore
5Note that we can choose bases two and three e.g. with probability p
2
each
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F¯ = 1 − ǫ. F¯ and the entanglement fidelity Fe are related by the formula
Fe =
3F¯−1
2 [40] which also leads to the 6.8% by use of the quantum Fano
inequality.
The given bounds for BB84 and the six–state protocol on the maximal
entropy of ρ are optimal, since Eve can simply prepare the state eq.(30).
Even if we consider Alice preparing the particles and sending them off to
Bob, we cannot achieve a better bound. This is because the state eq. (30)
can be effected by Eve with the following strategy: apply the Pauli matrix
σz with probability λ2 (σy with λ3 and σx with λ4) on the sent quantum
state and with probability λ1 take no action.
By conditioning on the random variable W = X ⊕ Y , however, we can
improve the security threshold in a similar manner as we did in the BB84
analysis. This leads to a value of ǫ ≈ 0.1262 for the six–state protocol, which
coincides with the result of an earlier calculation by Lo [41] based on a result
by Bennett et al. [42].
5.3 B92
In 1992, Bennett [5] suggested a protocol for quantum key distribution that
belongs to the class of prepare and measure protocols differs, however, sig-
nificantly from BB84 and the six–state protocol. In the specification of the
protocol, known as B92, Alice sends one of two non–orthogonal quantum
states, which we will denote by |u±〉, to Bob. He chooses randomly to mea-
sure in one of two von Neumann measurements. The first measurement
consists of the vectors {|u−〉, |u˜−〉}, where |u˜−〉 is orthogonal to |u−〉. Simi-
larly, the second measurement is given by {|u+〉, |u˜+〉} with |u˜+〉 orthogonal
to |u+〉. Bob announces acceptance if he obtains outcomes corresponding to
|u˜±〉, otherwise both parties discard the values that they recorded.
Alice records the bit value 0/1 if she sends |u+〉/|u−〉 and Bob jots down
the value 0/1 if he obtains |u˜−〉/|u˜+〉. We will assume throughout the anal-
ysis that Alice sends each quantum state with equal probability and Bob
chooses randomly and with equal probability between his two measurements.
Note that in the case of perfect transmission, the strings, conditioned
upon acceptance are identical and randomly distributed. We will now pro-
ceed to show how one can apply our generic security proof to this specific
protocol in the presence of noise. To do so, we need to estimate the ex-
pressions in (22) where R is the sets of possible quantum states conditioned
on the event that Alice and Bob accept. As in the analysis of BB84 and
the six–state protocol, we will condition on an additional random variable,
which equals the XOR of Alice’s and Bob’s bits after acceptance.
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For the following analysis, let pxy for x, y ∈ {0, 1}, be the probability
that Alice and Bob accept a particle and that they have the bit values x
and y, respectively. We can without loss of generality assume that p00 = p11
and p01 = p10 (Alice and Bob can simply abort the protocol if this is not
the case).
Let {|0〉, |1〉} be an orthonormal basis and write
|u±〉 = β|0〉 ± α|1〉
|u˜±〉 = α|0〉 ∓ β|1〉
with α ∈ (0, 1√
2
) and β =
√
1− α2. The interaction of the transmitted
quantum states with the environment or a possible eavesdropper, Eve, is
given by
|u±〉|e〉 7→ |Ψ±〉 :=
√
1− δ|u±〉|e±〉+
√
δ|u˜±〉|e˜±〉 , (33)
where δ = 4p01 = 4p10. (Note that the factor 4 results from the random
choices of Alice and Bob.)
The evolution in equation eq. (33) is unitary which implies the important
constraint
〈 u+ |u− 〉 = 〈Ψ+ |Ψ− 〉 .
This constraint reads in its expanded form
β2 − α2 = (1− δ)(β2 − α2) 〈 e+ | e− 〉
+
√
(1− δ)δ 2αβ (〈 e+ | e˜− 〉+ 〈 e˜+ | e− 〉)
+ δ(α2 − β2) 〈 e˜+ | e˜− 〉 .
(34)
Without loss of generality we can take 〈 e+ | e− 〉 to be real. Eve’s quantum
states, given the outcome was accepted by Bob and that Alice and Bob
have the same bit value, are denoted by |f±〉. In the case of an error and
acceptance, we write |f˜±〉, where ± denotes Alice’s bit value 0/1. One easily
obtains
|f±〉 := 〈 u˜∓ |Ψ± 〉√
γ
=
√
1− δ 2αβ|e±〉+
√
δ(α2 − β2)|e˜±〉√
γ
(35)
|f˜±〉 := 〈 u˜± |Ψ± 〉√
δ
= |e˜±〉 (36)
where γ = 4p00 = 4p11 is given by the probability that Alice and Bob have
a correct value,
γ = (1− 2δ)(2αβ)2 + 2
√
(1− δ)δ2αβ(α2 − β2)Re 〈 e± | e˜± 〉+ δ . (37)
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Eve’s density matrices, conditioned on the correctness/ falseness of the ac-
cepted bit, are given by
σ := 12 (|f+〉〈f+|+ |f−〉〈f−|)
σ˜ := 12
(|f˜+〉〈f˜+|+ |f˜−〉〈f˜−|) = 12(|e˜+〉〈e˜+|+ |e˜−〉〈e˜−|)
and have eigenvalues 1±|〈 f+ | f− 〉|2 and
1±|〈 e˜+ | e˜− 〉|
2 , respectively. Every esti-
mate for the scalar products 〈 f+ | f− 〉 and 〈 e˜+ | e˜− 〉 thus leads to an esti-
mate of the entropy of σ and σ˜. 〈 f+ | f− 〉 takes the form
〈 f+ | f− 〉 = (1− δ) 〈 e+ | e− 〉 − (β
2 − α2)2
γ
where we made use of eq. (34) to simplify the expression in the nominator.
It thus remains to find an estimate for 〈 e+ | e− 〉. This will be done by
use of the unitarity constraint, eq. (34). In particular, we can choose δ such
that 〈 e+ | e− 〉 is sufficiently close to one. For small Re 〈 e± | e˜± 〉, we thus
derived lower bound on the scalar product 〈 f+ | f− 〉. Note that δ and γ
can be derived from the probabilities pxy which are determined by Alice and
Bob. Together with eq. (37), this gives an estimate for Re 〈 e± | e˜± 〉. Using
the trivial bound S(σ˜) ≤ 1, this suffices to find a bound for the rate of B92
according to eq. (22).
As a specific example let us consider the depolarizing channel
ρ→ (1− p)ρ+ p
3
∑
i
σiρσi .
It is easy to compute the quantities pxy for this channel. In particular, we
obtain
p01 = p10 = p/6
and
p00 = p11 =
1
4
(1− 4
3
p)(2αβ)2 +
2
3
p
i.e., δ = 23p. Using eq. (37) and γ = 4p00 = 4p11, we have Re 〈 e± | e˜± 〉 = 0.
The error rate conditioned on acceptance, is thus given by
ǫ =
δ
(1− 2δ)η + 2δ with η := (2αβ)
2 .
From Re 〈 e+ | e˜+ 〉 = 0 follows Re 〈 e+ | e˜− 〉 ≤
√
1− | 〈 e+ | e− 〉 |2 which we
insert into eq. (34). We therefore have an estimate of the terms proportional
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to
√
δ. For the third term of the right hand side of eq. (34), we use take the
trivial estimate Re 〈 e˜+ | e˜− 〉 ≥ −1. Altogether we have
ν (1− 〈 e+ | e− 〉)2 ≤ 1− 〈 e+ | e− 〉2 with ν := (1− δ)(1 − η)
4δη
.
The valid solutions of this quadratic expression are given by
〈 e+ | e− 〉 ≥ ν − 1
ν + 1
and directly lead to an estimate for S(σ). Using S(σ˜) ≤ 1 we obtain an
estimate for the entropy of the quantum state of Alice and Bob conditioned
on the random variable W . The total rate is given by
R =
(1− 2δ)η + 2δ
2
(
1− h(ǫ)− ǫ− (1− ǫ)h(x))
where
x :=
(1− 5δ)(1 − δ)η(1 − η)
(δ + (1− 2δ)η)((1 − δ)− (1− 5δ)η)
The highest security threshold p is obtained for α ≈ 0.38 and equals
p ≈ 0.036. This is a slight improvement of the previously obtained security
threshold p ≈ 0.034 by Tamaki, Koashi and Imoto [21].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a security proof for a generic quantum key
distribution protocol. The protocol requires only single particle measure-
ments on Alice’s and Bob’s sides and uses one-way information reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification to extract a secret key from the raw data. In
our proof we estimate the amount of classical correlation contained in Alice’s
and Bob’s data and derive a bound on the quantum information, which a
possible adversary might have about this data. Subsequently, we apply a
recent result by Ko¨nig, Maurer and Renner [1] to ensure the security of the
privacy amplification stage.
Special cases of our protocol include entanglement based quantum key
distribution, such as E91, and prepare and measure schemes, such as BB84 or
the six state protocol. We were able to derive security thresholds of 11.0%
bit error rate for BB84 (four–state protocol) and 12.6% for the six–state
protocol, previously obtained by Shor and Preskill, and Lo, respectively.
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Furthermore we have shown how our technique can be applied to prove the
security of B92. In the case of the depolarizing channel this leads to a slight
improvement of the security threshold that has been recently obtained by
Tamaki, Koashi and Imoto.
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